Determinants of the assignment of E.U. funds to Portuguese municipalities
Introduction
The main objective of the paper is to analyze the impact of political factors on the distribution of European Union (EU) transfers to Portuguese municipalities. 1 Portugal joined the European Community in 1986, and started receiving European funds through the European Regional Policy. Access to European funds had a significant impact on Portuguese municipalities. They enlarged local governments' resources, allowing for an improvement of local infra-structure and for an expansion of the scope of municipalities'
activities. More attention was given to the organization of territory and to the establishment of relationships with foreign entities. EU funds represented between 5% and 12% of municipalities' revenues during the period under analysis (1992 to 2006).
The Portuguese central government negotiates with the European authorities over funding levels and sets the framework for distributing funds across municipalities. Although the normative goals of these funds, as suggested by the theory on fiscal federalism, 2 are to promote efficiency in the production of local public goods and equity among regions, they may be subject to political influences that prevent them from fully achieving these objectives. The grant giver may distribute more funds in pre electoral years in order to increase its chances of re-election, as suggested by the literature on pork barrel politics (Ferejohn, 1974) and political business cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) . It is also possible that recipient municipal governments exert more pressure to receive funds during local election periods. According to the literature on tactical redistribution, the grant giver may target localities with more swing voters in the allocation of funds (Lindbeck and 2 Weibull, 1987, and 1993) but may favour his supporters if he is risk-averse (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) . Later on, Dixit and Londregan (1996) developed a model where parties favour their core support group when they are more effective in delivering favours to them, but woo the group that is most willing to switch their vote in response for economic favours if they are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group. Parties may also compromise their own ideology, by adjusting their platforms and pork-barrel components of policy, to attract swing voters (Dixit and Londregan, 1998) .
Several studies have analyzed the political determinants of the distribution of intergovernmental grants but, as far as we know, tests have never been performed using data on EU funds. Case (2001) examined the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to sub-federal governments in Albania, and found that more assistance was allocated to swing communes (local government units) and to those that might be pivotal to winning a majority of seats in Parliament. Using data from a temporary program that distributed "ecological" grants from the Swedish central government to municipalities, Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) reported strong support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government (socialist) purchased votes by investing in those municipalities where there are a lot of swing voters, but not where it has more supporters. Also for the Swedish case, Johansson (2003) reported evidence that municipalities with a high number of swing voters receive a higher proportion of intergovernmental grants. On the contrary, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) analyzing the effects of party control of state government on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties in the U.S., found that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favour of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support, and little or no support for the swing voter model. Hanes (2007) using observations for temporary grants in Sweden, over three electoral periods, concluded 3 that under Socialist governments (1985 and 1988) municipalities with a high share of Socialist voters were more likely to apply for grants, and to receive them; while this was not the case under the 1982 Conservative government. Using Spanish data, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) found that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities.
The impact of political factors in the distribution of intergovernmental grants in Portugal, as the country matured from a young to an established democracy, was examined by Veiga and Pinho (2007) . 3 Their results indicate that in the early years of democracy (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , grants were allocated tactically across municipalities that is, municipalities ruled by mayors that belonged to the Prime Minister's party, and with more swing voters were favoured in the distribution process. Howevere, these phenomena are not visible in the established democracy period. Regarding opportunistic effects, they found that increases in the amount of grants transferred to municipalities during municipal and legislative election years are larger in the second period of the sample (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , than in the first one.
The present paper focuses on the political economy of the allocation of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities. To our knowledge, this kind of analysis has never been performed either for Portugal or any other EU country. The empirical research is implemented on an extensive panel covering all mainland municipalities (278), from 1992 to 2006. 4 This rich data set contains information on municipal accounts, demographic and socio-economic data regarding the local jurisdictions, and election data for local and central 4 governments. Portugal is also an interesting case because access to EU funds allowed for a substantial increase of local governments' financial resources. Furthermore, municipal election dates are set exogenously from the perspective of local governments. They occur in all municipalities at the same time and, during the period under analysis, they were always at the end of the year.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a discussion of the Portuguese institutional structure and section 3 describes the dataset. The empirical strategy is explained in section 4 and the empirical results are presented subsequently.
Finally, conclusions are reported in section 6.
Portuguese institutional framework
There are two levels of sub-national governments in Portugal: the autonomous regions and municipalities. 5 Regional governments exist only in the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores, that is, for mainland Portugal, only the municipal level applies.
The first local elections after the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 took place in December 1976. After 1976 elections were held every three years until 1985 and every four years after that. The representative branches of municipal governments are the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly. The members of the Town Council are elected directly by voters registered in the municipality, who vote for party or independent lists. Following the election, the candidate at the top of the list receiving the most votes becomes the mayor; he is the president of the Town Council and has a prominent role in executive tasks. 5 There are 308 municipalities in Portugal, and there is also an infra-municipal level composed of 4259 counties (freguesias).
For a description of local governments in Portugal see Silva (2008) .
5
There has been a progressive expansion of the activities of municipalities over time.
During the first years of democracy, local governments were mainly concerned with the development of infrastructure, including facilities for sewage and for water and electricity Because there are no regional governments in Portugal, central authorities decide over the distribution of funds to municipalities. Despite politically neutral official program goals, political influences may distort the decision process. 9 Rent-seeking activities, particularly with re-election purposes, may appear both at the central and local levels. When negotiating with the European authorities, the National Government may try to obtain a higher quota of the funds, not only to promote regional development, but also to use as a political tool. Local authorities may lobby the central government to extract more funds, 10 especially in local election years, in order to signal competence to their constituents.
The dataset
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The dataset used in the paper covers all municipalities in mainland Portugal (278), from 1992 to 2006. It contains information on municipal accounts, demography, socio-economic characteristics and elections for local and national governments. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical work.
<Table 2>
Data on municipal accounts were obtained from the Direcção Geral das Autoridades Locais 
Empirical strategy
Our dependent variable is real EU funds per capita received by municipality i in year t (EU_Funds it ). It is measured in real terms, to control for price increases over time, and defined per capita in order to take into account size differences among municipalities. The following variables are included to test for political influences on the distribution of EU funds to municipalities:
-Legislative Election it is a dummy variable equal to one in legislative election years, and zero otherwise. This variable tests for pork barrel policies using grants. In order to woo the electorate, the central government may increase grants transferred to municipalities. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected.
-Local Election Year i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in municipal election years, and zero otherwise. It tests for increases in EU grants during municipal election years. have found that, in pre-electoral periods, Portuguese mayors increase expenditures, particularly on items that are highly visible to the electorate, in order to enhance their chances of re-election. 11 If local politicians pressure the central government to obtain more funds to woo the electorate, the coefficient associated with this variable should be positive.
-Years mayor in office it is the number of years a mayor has been in office. 12 It tests the hypothesis that mayors who stay in office longer have better knowledge of the distribution process and are, therefore, more able to extract funds from the distributing agency. A positive coefficient is expected.
-Same Party it is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the mayor and the primeminister belong to the same political party. Since this variable tests the Cox and 10
McCubbins's (1986) hypothesis that the grant giver favours his supporters in the allocation of funds, a positive coefficient is expected.
-Gov % Votes Previous Election it measures the percentage of votes received in the municipality by the party in the central government in the previous legislative election. Under the Cox and McCubbins's (1986) hypothesis, a positive coefficient is also expected for the coefficient associated with this variable.
-Abs Dif Votes Previous Election it is the absolute value of the difference in vote shares in each municipality between the main party in the central government and its main opponent, in the last legislative election. This variable is used as a proxy for the number of swing voters; 13 it allows us to test whether the distribution agency targets or not municipalities with many undecided voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; and Dixit and Londregan, 1998) . A negative coefficient would be consistent with this hypothesis.
In order to take local population's needs and the wealth of the municipality into account, several variables described below were also considered. They are all lagged one year, because data are not immediately reported and available to policymakers.
-Population it-1 represents the number of inhabitants in a municipality, in thousands, in the previous year. If there are economies of scale in the provision of local public goods, per capita grants are expected to decrease with communities' size (a negative coefficient).
-Illiteracy rate it-1 is the percentage of illiterates in the municipality's population, in the previous year. This is a proxy for the municipality's level of development. Given that a major objective of EU funds is to reduce disparities among regions, a positive sign is expected for the coefficient associated with this variable.
-National_taxes it-1 is the national taxes per capita collected in the municipality, in the previous year. This variable is a proxy for the municipality's wealth, and therefore, a negative sign is expected for the coefficient associated with it, if grants are distributed to reduce disparities. However, since projects funded by the EU require co-funding with local resources, a positive sign is also plausible for the coefficient associated with this variable.
The empirical model can be described by the following equation:
where, y it is the dependent variable, p is the number of lags of the dependent variable, ' ,t i X is a vector of explanatory variables, α and β β β β are vectors of parameters to estimate, ν i is the individual effect of municipality i, and ε i,t is the error term.
The model could be estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares method, assuming the municipal specific effects as fixed or random. However, in a linear dynamic panel model, when the sample shows a clear dominance of the number of individuals over time periods, this procedure generates inconsistent estimates of the model's parameters, given that the lagged value of the dependent variable is correlated with the error term. This is the case of the panel dataset under analysis, which includes 278 municipalities and 15 years of observations. Arellano and Bond (1991) have developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to overcome the problems mentioned above. Since there is persistence in the series, the extended version of the GMM estimator for dynamic datasets proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) , the system-GMM estimator, will be used in the empirical work.
Empirical Results
Estimation results for the model described in the previous section, using the system-GMM method for linear dynamic panel data models, 14 are shown in (1995 & 1999) , which only takes the value of one in 1995 and 1999. Since the latter dummy is highly statistically significant, there is clear evidence of opportunistic manipulation of grants in the legislative election years of 1995 and 1999. The remaining results reported in column 2 are very similar to those of column 1. The exception is that the variable used to proxy the number of indecisive voters in the municipality (Abs Dif Votes Previous Election) is now marginally statistically significant, suggesting that municipalities received more grants when the party in office had won by a narrower margin in the prceding election.
In column 3, the dummy variable for the local election years was interacted with the dummies that, respectively, indicate party similarity and absence of party similarity between the mayor and the Prime-Minister. This modification of the model permits a test of the 14 hypothesis that mayors belonging to the prime-minister's party are favoured in local election years. Both estimated coefficients are positive, and statistically significant, but a Wald test does not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that they are equal. The same interaction was formed with the dummy for the 1995 and 1999 legislative election years, in column 4. Again, a Wald test does not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that the coefficients estimated for the interactions are equal.
The estimations whose results are reported in Table 4 include other variables that proxy municipal wealth, besides the per capita amount of national taxes collected in the municipality, and exclude two variables that were not statistically significant in the estimations of 
<Table 5>
The last empirical exercise performed, which is reported in Table 6 
<Table 6>
The results obtained for CSF III (2000 III ( -2006 are reported in column 3. Again, they are supportive of the hypothesis that grant transfers increase in local election years. In fact, the estimated coefficient is much larger than in columns 1 and 2, indicating that the opportunistic manipulation of grant transfers was larger in the period 2000-2006 than in previous years. 19 The results concerning legislative elections are exactly the opposite, as the estimated coefficient for Legislative Election Year is negative and statistically significant. 
Conclusions
The entrance of Portugal to the European Community in 1986 allowed local governments to benefit from EU funds. These transfers significantly increased their revenues, contributing
to an expansion of their areas of intervention and to an improvement of local comunnnities Notes: -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. -Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equations in levels). -m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically χ 2 . P-value is reported. Notes: -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. -Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equations in levels). -m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically χ 2 . P-value is reported. Notes: -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. -Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equations in levels). -m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically χ 2 . P-value is reported.
Tabela formatada 26 Notes: -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. -Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equations in levels). -m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically χ 2 . P-value is reported.
